"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies" by Hitoshi Matsushima
CIRJE Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html
Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author.
CIRJE-F-519
Detail-Free Mechanism Design
in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies
Hitoshi Matsushima
University of Tokyo
September 2007  1
 
Detail-Free Mechanism Design 





Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo 
 
May 20, 2007 
(First Version: June 14, 2004) 
                                                 
+ The title of the first version was “Large Auction Design in Dominance” (CIRJE-F-282, University 
of Tokyo: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2004/2004cf282.pdf). This research was 
supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI 15330036, 18330035) from the 
Japan society for the promotion of science (JSPS) and MEXT of the Japanese Government and a 
grant from the Center for Advanced Research in Finance (CARF) at the University of Tokyo. I am 
grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. All errors are mine. 
* Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-Ku, Tokyo 113, Japan. Fax: 
+81-3-5841-5521. E-mail: hitoshi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp   2
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete 
information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions 
and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With 
a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a 
detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete 
information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified. 
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 This  paper  investigates  the  unique implementation problem in economic environments 
with incomplete information and interdependent values, wherein a sufficiently large 
number of players exist with single-unit supplies and demands. Each player receives her 
respective private signals that are correlated with each other through some unobservable 
macro shock. Each player’s value for the commodity depends not only on her private signal 
but also on this macro shock, which implies interdependent values. The central planner   3
attempts to design a well-behaved mechanism in that, irrespective of the macro shock that 
occurs, every strategy profile that satisfies a defined equilibrium concept can induce a 
competitive allocation with complete information at least approximately and almost 
certainly. 
  The standard approach in the implementation literature with incomplete information 
has assumed that the central planner has complete knowledge of the specifications of the 
environments, such as the payoff and signal structures, and tailors a mechanism for the 
finer details of these specifications. See Jackson (1991), Palfrey (1992), Matsushima (1990, 
1993), Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994), and Maskin and Sjöström (2002). Equilibrium 
concepts such as the Nash equilibrium and iterative dominance have generally been used; 
these concepts rely on the strong rationality assumption that it is not only mutual 
knowledge but also common knowledge for the players to avoid playing dominated 
strategies. These assumptions are regarded as the drawbacks of the standard 
implementation problem and have been criticized from the practical and experimental 
viewpoints. In fact, many authors studying auction design from the practical standpoint 
have confined their attention to auction protocols that are detail-free, i.e., independent of 
the finer details of the specifications. See Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004), and Klemperer 
(2004). Several experimental studies have reported that subjects in laboratory experiments 
like guessing games made a maximum of two or three iterative removals of dominated 
strategies. For instance, see Camerer (2003, Chapter 5). 
Based on the above viewpoints, this paper considers the situation in which the central 
planner is unaware of the specifications of the environment. From the practical viewpoint,   4
we consider the central planner who, instead of tailoring a mechanism based on the 
specifications, attempts to design a detail-free mechanism that implements the desired 
allocations irrespective of how the environment is specified.
1 Further, based on the 
experimental viewpoint, we use the equilibrium concept of twice iterative dominance, 
which requires players to eliminate dominated strategies only two times iteratively. Twice 
iterative dominance is based solely on the weak rationality assumption that it is not 
common but mutual knowledge among the players that they do not play dominated 
strategies. The main theorem of this paper is permissive, which reveals that with a minor 
restriction on the class of possible environments, there exists a detail-free mechanism that 
can virtually implement competitive allocations with complete information in twice 
iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified. 
The constructed mechanism describes the following three-stage procedure. The central 
planner divides the players into a sufficient number of distinct groups, each of which 
includes an adequate number of sellers and buyers. The central planner then requires each 
player to announce three price bids as follows. In stage 1, each player announces the first 
bid. After the first bid announcement, she observes the first bid announcements in the 
preceding group. In stage 2, she announces the second bid. After the second bid 
announcement, she observes the first bid announcements in all groups other than her own. 
                                                 
1 The detail-free concept in this paper implies that the mechanisms are independent of the fine 
details of value functions, signal spaces, and probability functions. The mechanisms, however, 
depend on several model settings, such as the finiteness of the signal spaces, single unit demands 
and supplies, and the numbers of sellers and buyers.   5
Finally, in stage 3, she announces the third bid. 
In order to determine the allocation, the central planner randomly uses two rules: the 
random fixed price rule and the price-taking rule. With a positive but very low probability, 
the central planner uses the random fixed price rule, according to which she selects a 
trading price randomly and independent of the players’ announcements. The random fixed 
price rule incentivizes the players to announce their expected values honestly. In particular, 
their first bids completely reveal their private signals. Further, on account of the law of 
large numbers, their second and third bids can approximate their true values associated with 
the private signals and the unobservable macro shock. 
With a very high probability, the central planner uses the price-taking rule instead of 
the random fixed price rule. The central planner balances the transfers within each group. 
For each group, she calculates the market-clearing price that equalizes the supplies and 
demands associated with the second bids within that group. In order to conduct the transfers 
within each group, the central planner sets the trading price for this group such that it is 
equal to the market-clearing price for its preceding group and accords the priority to players 
whose third bids are greater than this price. Since the trading price for each group is 
determined independent of the announcements in this group, and the signals possessed by 
the other players in this group are relatively uninformative with respect to all the signals 
possessed by the players in the other groups, it follows that all players in this group are 
willing to adopt price-taking behaviors in the virtual sense for their third bid 
announcements. Hence, they have the incentive to almost honestly announce their 
conditional expected values that approximate their true values.   6
The standard analysis of competitive markets with interdependent values has assumed 
the form of a non-strategic price taker and investigated a rational expectation equilibrium; 
for instance, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Chapter 19). Each trader updates 
her belief based on the market price and the forecast function that maps private signal 
profiles to trading prices, and then maximizes the updated expected utility as a 
non-strategic price taker. In order to demonstrate a strategic foundation for a rational 
expectation equilibrium, Reny and Perry (2006) investigated the standard model of a large 
double auction and established the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that resembles 
the rational expectation equilibrium. Also, see McLean, Peck, and Postlewaite (2005). 
These studies have not considered the issue of uniqueness, which is the central theme of the 
implementation theory. Moreover, since the trading price for each player is determined 
independent of her price bids, we do not require any price grid device to restrict the 
players’ price manipulations as employed by Reny and Perry (2006). 
In the implementation literature, Matsushima (2006a) investigated the possibility that 
a detail-free mechanism implements social choice functions in general environments. 
Matsushima (2006a) assumed that each player has an intrinsic preference for honest 
reporting. This paper focuses on players who are motivated only by their material interests. 
Another paper by Matsushima (2006b) investigated implementation possibilities of 
efficient allocations on the assumption that players can conduct a maximum of three 
iterative removals of dominated strategies. Matsushima (2006b) used mechanisms that are 
not detail-free and therefore depend on the finer details of the specifications. 
Bergemann and Morris (2005a, 2005b) studied the robustness of mechanism design on   7
the assumption that the environment is not common knowledge among the players and the 
central planner. In contrast, the present paper permits the common knowledge assumption 
among the players with respect to the environment and focuses on the case in which the 
central planner is unaware of the environment specifications. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents definitions and 
notations. Section 3 demonstrates the main theorem. Section 4 presents a brief sketch of the 
proof of the main theorem. Section 5 presents the full proof. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Let  n  and  r  denote two positive integers. Let  {1,..., } { 1,...,2 } Nn r n rn r = + ∪  
denote the set of players, where the first  nr   players are regarded as the sellers and the last 
nr players are regarded as the buyers. We assume that both  n and r  are sufficiently 
large. Each seller possesses one unit of the commodity, and therefore, the total amount of 
the commodity equals nr . Let 
2 {0,1}
nr A⊂  denote the set of alternatives, where 
2 () { 0 , 1 }
nr




= ∑ , and  1 i a =  ( 0 i a = ) 
implies that player  i consumes one (zero) unit of the commodity. Let  () A ∆  denote the 





=∏ ,  i M  is the set of messages for player iN ∈ ,  ii mM ∈ ,  () iiN mm M ∈ =∈ , 
) ( : A M g ∆ → ,  () iiN xx ∈ = ,  : i x MR → , and  () i x m  implies the monetary transfer to   8




= ∑  for all 
mM ∈ . The central planner chooses any alternative aA ∈  with  probability 
() ( )[ 0 , 1 ] gm a∈ . 
Each player observes a private signal,  i ω . Let  i Ω   denote the finite set of player  ' is  
private signals, where we assume that  1 Ω = Ωi  for all iN ∈ . Let  () iiN ω ω ∈ =  denote a 
private signal profile, and let  i iN ∈ Ω= ×Ω denote a set of private signal profiles. Let 
\{ } () ij j N i ω ω −∈ =  and 
\{ } ij jN i − ∈ Ω=×Ω . We assume that there exists a macro shock  0 ω  that 
is  unobservable to the players. Let  0 Ω  denote the finite set of macro shocks. A 
combination of the private signal profile and the macro shock  0 (, ) ω ω  is randomly 
determined according to the probability function  0 :( 0 , 1 ] f Ω ×Ω→ . We assume 
conditional independence in that there exist  00 :( 0 , 1 ] f Ω →  and  101 (| ) : ( 0 , 1 ] f ω ⋅ Ω→  for 
each  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  such  that 
00 0 1 0 (, ) () (|) i
iN




                                                 
2  Reny and Perry (2006) assumed the conditional independence in the same manner as in this paper, 
where each player’s private signal is determined according to the identical conditional distribution 
function. However, we can relax this assumption by permitting the sellers’ private signals and the 
buyers’ private signals to be determined according to the different conditional distribution functions. 
The paper by Fudenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl (2007) investigated large double auctions on this   9
The value function is defined by  01 :( 0 , 1 ] v Ω ×Ω → .
3 Each  player  ' is  value  for  one 
unit of the commodity depends on the macro shock  00 ω ∈Ω  as well as her private signal 
ii ω ∈Ω , and is given by  0 (,)( 0 , 1 ] i v ω ω ∈ . We assume quasi-linearity and risk neutrality in 
that the player  ' is  utility is given by  0 (,) ii i av t ω ω + , where  i tR ∈  is the monetary 
transfer to player  i. 
A combination  01 0 1 (,,, , ) ef f v ≡Ω Ω  defines  an  environment. We use  E  to  denote  a 
set of environments that satisfies the following three assumptions, which are generically 
very weak restrictions. 
 
Assumption 1: For every  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  and  every  } { \ 0 0 0 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
10 10 (| ) (| ) ff ω ω′ ⋅≠ ⋅. 
 
  Assumption 1 implies that the different macro shocks correspond to the different 
probability distributions of the private signal. 
 
Assumption 2: For every  00 ω ∈Ω  and  every  (0,1] v∈ , 











≠ ∑ . 
                                                                                                                                                     
relaxed conditional independence assumption; however, this paper focused only on the private value 
cases. 
3  The mapping into the interval  [0,1]  simply implies that the payoffs are uniformly bounded.   10
 
 Since  0 Ω  and  1 Ω  are finite sets, it holds generically in the class of conditional 










= ∑ , which automatically implies Assumption 2. 
Let 
00
00 () (,)( |) ii i vv f
ω
ω ωω ω ω
∈Ω
≡ ∑    





















   
is the probability of the macro shock  0 ω  occurring conditional on the private signal 
ii ω ∈Ω . 
 
Assumption 3: For every  1 1 Ω ∈ ω  and  every  } { \ 1 1 1 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
     11 () () vv ω ω′ ≠ . 
 
Since  1 Ω  is a finite set, it holds generically in the class of environments that the 
different private signals correspond to the different expected values, which is exactly the 
same as what Assumption 3 implies. 
A strategy for player iN ∈  is denoted by  : ii i sM Ω → . Let  i S  denote the set of   11
strategies for player i. Let  i iN SS
∈ ≡× ,  () iiN ss S ∈ = ∈ , and  () (( ) ) ii i N ss M ω ω ∈ = ∈ . The 
expected utility for player  i  when the players play a strategy profile  s S ∈   is denoted by 




( ) { ( , ) ( ( ))( ) ( ( ))} ( , ) ii i i
aA
us a v g s a xs f
ωω
ω ωω ω ω ω
∈Ω ×Ω ∈
≡+ ∑∑ . 
A strategy  ii sS ∈  for player i is said to be undominated in (,) Ge if there exists no 
ii s S ′∈  such  that 
     (, ) ( ) ii i i uss us − ′ >  for  all  ii sS − − ∈ . 
Let 
1
ii SS ⊂  denote the set of undominated strategies for player  i in ( , ) Ge. A strategy 
ii sS ∈  for player i is said to be twice iteratively undominated in  ( , ) Ge if 
1
ii sS ∈  and 
there exists no 
1
ii sS ′∈  such  that 
     (, ) ( ) ii i i uss us − ′ >  for  all 
1
ii sS − − ∈ . 
  For every environment eE ∈   and every macro shock  00 ω ∈Ω , we define 
*
0 (, )[ 0 , 1 ] pe ω ∈  by 
    
*
11 0 1 0
11 0








< ∑  and 
*
11 0 1 0
11 0








< ∑ , 
where we used Assumption 2 to guarantee its existence.
4 Since the total amount of the 
                                                 
4   Note from Assumption 2 that for each  00 ω ∈Ω , there exists  11 ω ∈Ω  such  that 
*
01 0 (,) (, ) vp e ωω ω = . This ensures that with sufficient players, it is almost certain that the trading 
price is set equal to 
*
0 (, ) p e ω   in the mechanisms constructed in this paper. With the exception of 
this point, Assumption 2 is not considerably relevant to the main theorem of this paper.   12
commodity  nr  is merely half the number of the players  2nr, we can regard 
*
0 (, ) p e ω  as 
the competitive price at the macro shock  00 ω ∈Ω  in the environment eE ∈  when the 
number of players is sufficiently large. Note that the proportion of the players who observe 
the private signal  1 ω  is approximated by  11 0 (|) f ω ω . Hence, the first inequality implies 
that less than a half of the players are willing to sell the commodity for the price 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . 
The second inequality implies that less than a half of the players are willing to buy the 
commodity for 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . The rest of the players are indifferent to buying the commodity 
for 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . This implies that 
*
0 (, ) p e ω   equalizes the demand and supply. 
 
3. The Theorem 
 






=  arbitrarily, where 
() l n  and 
() l r  are increasing 
with respect to l , and 
() () lim( , ) ( , )
ll
l nr







= , where 
() (,, , ,)
l Gn r M g x =  and 
() () (,) ( , )
ll nr n r =  for  all  1 l ≥ . 
 






=  such that for 
every  eE ∈ , every  0 ε > , and every sufficiently large  1 l ≥ , any twice iteratively 
undominated strategy profile s S ∈  in 
() (, )
l G e  satisfies the following properties. Fix 
iN ∈  and  00 (,) ii ω ω ∈Ω× Ω arbitrarily.   13
(i) Suppose 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω > ; then, 










≥− ∑ ∑ , 
(2)      0











≥− ∑     i f   {1,..., } in r ∈ , 
and 















≥− ∑    if  {1 , . . . , 2 } in r n r ∈ + . 
(ii) Suppose 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω < ; then, 










≤ ∑ ∑ , 















≥− ∑    if  {1,..., } in r ∈ , 
and 
(6)      0











≥− ∑     i f   {1 , . . . , 2 } in r n r ∈ + , 
where  01 0
\{ }
(| ) ( | ) ii j
jN i
ff ω ωω ω −−
∈
≡ ∏  denotes the probability of  ii ω−− ∈Ω  occurring 
conditional on  00 ω ∈Ω . 
  
The left-hand side of inequalities (1) and (4) represents the probability of player  i 
consuming one unit of the commodity at the macro shock  0 ω . Inequality (1) implies that 
any player iN ∈  almost certainly consumes the commodity if 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω > . 
Inequality (4) implies that any player iN ∈   rarely consumes the commodity if   14
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω < . 
The left-hand side of inequalities (2) and (6) represents the probability that the 
monetary transfer to player i is close to zero. Inequality (2) implies that it is almost 
certain that the monetary transfer to any seller  {1,..., } in r ∈   is close to zero if 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω > . Inequality (6) implies that it is almost certain that the monetary 
transfer to any buyer  {1 , . . . , 2 } in r n r ∈+   is close to zero if 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω < . 
The left-hand side of inequality (3) represents the probability that the monetary 
transfer to player  i is close to 
*
0 (, ) p e ω − . Inequality (3) implies that it is almost certain 
that the monetary transfer to any buyer  { 1,...,2 } in r n r ∈ +  is close to 
*
0 (, ) p e ω −  if 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω > . The left-hand side of inequality (5) represents the probability that the 
monetary transfer to player  i  is close to 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . Inequality (5) implies that it is almost 
certain that the monetary transfer to any seller  {1,..., } in r ∈  is close to 
*
0 (, ) p e ω  if 
*
00 (,) (, ) i vp e ωω ω < . 
Based on the above observations, the theorem states that when the number of players 
is sufficiently large, competitive allocations with complete information are virtually 
implementable in twice iterative dominance. Moreover, the theorem requires the used 
mechanisms to be detail-free, i.e., to be designed independent of the specifications of the 
environments. 
The proof of this theorem is constructive; an outline of the proof is provided in the 
following section.   15
 
4. Outline of the Proof 
  
The central planner divides the players into r   distinct groups. Each group 
} ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  is  defined  as 
     ( ) {( 1) 1,..., } {( 1) 1,...,( ) } Nn n r n r n N β ββ β β ≡− + + − + + ⊂ ∪ , 
which includes n sellers and n buyers.
5 Let  ( ) {1,..., } ir β ∈  denote the index of the 
group that includes player i , i.e.,  () ii β ∈ . We consider the following three-stage 
procedure, according to which the central planner requires each player to announce price 
bids thrice. 
 
Stage 1: Each player i announces the first bid  ,1 [0,1] i m ∈  and observes the first bid 
announcements  (( ) 1 ) , 1 , 1 (( ) 1 ) () [ 0 , 1 ]
n
Ni jj Ni mm ββ −∈ − ≡∈  in  the  preceding group  () 1 i β − . 
 
Stage 2: Each player i  announces the second bid  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () [ 0 , 1 ] iN i mm β − ∈ . After this 
                                                 
5 This paper assumes that the numbers of buyers and sellers are the same. The theorem, however, 
does not depend on this assumption. Suppose that the number of buyers is  b nr  and that of sellers 
is  s nr and  bs nn ≠ . In this case, we can show the results of the theorem without any substantial 
change by defining  r  distinct groups, each of which consists of  b n  buyers and  s n  sellers and 
replicates the whole market.   16
announcement, each player i   observes the first bid announcements 
(1 )
\ ( ( )),1 ,1 \ ( ( )) () [ 0 , 1 ]
nr
NN i j jNN i mm ββ
−
∈ ≡∈   in all groups other than group  () i β . 
 
Stage 3: Each player  i announces  the  third bid  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () [ 0 , 1 ] iN N i mm β ∈ . 
 
During this procedure, each player  iN ∈   cannot observe the first bid announcements 
of the other players in the same group  ( ) i β  and the second bid announcements of all the 
other players. The central planner determines an allocation and monetary transfers 
according to the random fixed price rule and the price-taking rule as follows. The central 
planner generally employs the price-taking rule. The random fixed price rule is used only 
with a positive but very low probability. As shown later in this paper, the first bid 
announcements reveal the private signals truthfully; the second bid announcements are 
utilized to calculate the competitive price with complete information; and the third bid 
announcements are generally the basis for determining the allocation. 
 
Random Fixed Price Rule: The central planner randomly selects a trading price  [0,1] p∈ . 
Consider the following six cases: 
,1 i mp < ,  ,1 nr i mp + > , 
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm p β − < ,  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () nr i N i mm p β +− > ,  
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm p β < , and  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () nr i N N i mm p β + > . 
For each  {0,...,6} k ∈ , each seller  i sells the commodity to buyer  in r +  for  p  with a   17
probability of  6
k   if and only if any  k   cases among these six cases occur at once. 
 
Price-Taking Rule: The central planner calculates the market-clearing price  ()[ 0 , 1 ] p β ∈  
for each group  {1,..., } r β ∈ , which is defined as the  nth highest bid among the second 
bids announced in group  β . Within each group  β , the central planner sets the trading 
price for the group equal to the market-clearing price  (1 ) p β −  of its preceding group 
1 β − . Every seller in each group  β  is compelled to sell the commodity to the central 
planner for  (1 ) p β − . The central planner then sells these  n units back to the players in 
the same group  β  whose third bids are greater than  (1 ) p β − . If less than  n players in 
group  β   make their third bids greater than  (1 ) p β − , the central planner randomly selects 
and compels players to buy the unsold commodities. If more than  n players make their 
third bids greater than  (1 ) p β − , the central planner randomly selects and sells the 
commodities to  n players  among  them. 
 
Note that the above procedure is detail-free, i.e., it does not depend on the finer details 
of the specifications. Fix an environment  eE ∈  arbitrarily. We show that each player’s 
first bid reveals her private signal truthfully. Note that each player’s first bid influences her 
payoff only through the random fixed price rule. Since the trading price  p  is randomly 
determined, each player  i  is willing to make the first bid  ,1 i m   equal to the expected value 
() ii v ω  conditional on her private signal  i ω  as being undominated. This, along with   18
Assumption 3, implies that each player’s first bid reveals her private signal truthfully. 
Next, we show that, almost certainly, each player  ' is  second bid approximates the 
true value  0 (, ) i v ω ω , and the market-clearing price  () p β  for  each  group  β  
approximates the competitive price 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . Note that each player’s second bid 
influences her payoff only through the random fixed price rule. Before announcing the 
second bid, each player i   has complete knowledge of the private signals 
(( ) 1 ) (( ) 1 ) 1 ()
n
Ni j j Ni ββ ωω −∈ − ≡∈ Ω  for the players in the preceding group  () 1 i β − . Since the 
trading price  p  is randomly determined, it follows that each player  i is willing  to make 
the second bid  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm β −  equal to the expected value conditional on the private 
signals  (( ) 1 ) Ni β ω −  for the members of the preceding group  () 1 i β −  and her private signal 
i ω , i.e., 
    
00
(( ) 1 ) 0 0 (( ) 1 ) (, ) (,)( |, ) iN i i iN i vv f ββ
ω
ωω ωω ω ωω −−
∈Ω
≡ ∑    
as being twice iteratively undominated, where 
00
10 0 0
{} ( () 1 )
0( ( ) 1 )
10 0 0



























   
denotes the probability of  0 ω  occurring conditional on  (( ) 1 ) (, ) iNi β ω ω − . Since the size of 
each group 2n is sufficiently large, it is almost certain from Assumption 1 that each 
player can almost correctly infer the true macro shock  0 ω  from  (( ) 1 ) Ni β ω − , and therefore, 
(( ) 1 ) (, ) iN i v β ω ω −  can  approximate  0 (, ) i v ω ω . Since the size 2n   of each group is   19
sufficiently large, it is almost certain that each group β  approximately replicates the 
whole, which, along with Assumption 2, implies that  () p β  approximates 
*
0 (, ) p e ω . 
  Finally, we show that each player  ' is  third bid almost certainly approximates the 
true value  0 (, ) i v ω ω , and the competitive allocations are approximately achieved. Before 
announcing the third bid, each player i  has full knowledge of the private signals 
(1 )
\(( ) ) 1
nr
NN i β ω
− ∈Ω   for all players out of group  () i β . Similarly, the random fixed price rule 
incentivizes each player  i to make the third bid  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β  equal to the expected 
value conditional on  \(( ) ) N Ni β ω , i.e., 
    
00
\(( ) ) 0 0 \(( ) ) (, ) (,)( |, ) iN N i i iN N i vv f ββ
ω
ωω ωω ω ωω
∈Ω
≡ ∑    
as being twice iteratively undominated, where 
00
10 0 0
{} \ ( () )
0\ ( ( ) )
10 0 0





ji N N i
iN Ni
j


















   
denotes the probability of  0 ω  occurring conditional on  \(( ) ) (, ) iN Ni β ω ω . Since the size of 
each group  2n is sufficiently large, it follows from Assumption 1 that  \(( ) ) (, ) iN N i v β ω ω  
almost certainly approximates  0 (, ) i v ω ω . 
Since the price-taking rule as well as the random fixed price rule is relevant to the 
third bid announcement, the above argument is not sufficient for the incentive to reveal any 
approximate value of  0 (, ) i v ω ω  as the third bid announcement. However, we can 
demonstrate that the price-taking rule does not provide each player with the incentive to   20
deviate from revealing any approximate value of the true value  0 (, ) i v ω ω   as follows. Let 
00
\{ } 0 0 (, ) (,)( |) iN i i vv f
ω
ω ωω ω ω ω
∈Ω
≡ ∑    


























    is the probability of  0 ω  occurring  conditional 
on  \{ } (, ) iN i ω ω . Note that the trading price for each group  β  is set such that it is equal to 
the market-clearing price  (1 ) p β −  for its preceding group  1 β − , which does not depend 
on the price bid announcements in group  β . Hence, each player  i has the incentive to 
announce any value between 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } min ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω  and 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } max ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω   as the third bid. 
Since the number of distinct groups r  is sufficiently large, it follows that both 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } min ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω  and 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } max ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω  are close to  \{ } (, ) iN i v ω ω . In other words, 
\{ } (, ) iN i v ω ω   does not depend to a large extent on  (( ) ) \ { } N ii β ω , and therefore, 
\(( ) ) (, ) iN Ni v β ω ω  certainly approximates  \{ } (, ) iN i v ω ω . This, along with the fact that the 
trading price for each group is independent of the price bid announcements in this group, 
implies that the price-taking rule does not provide player  i with the incentive to deviate 
from announcing any approximate value of  0 (,) i v ω ω  as her third bid. Note that the third 
bid is not necessarily equal to  \(( ) ) (, ) iN Ni v β ω ω ; however, it can be approximated by 
\(( ) ) (, ) iN Ni v β ω ω . Since the trading prices almost certainly approximate the competitive price 
*
0 (, ) p e ω , we have shown that the competitive allocations with complete information are   21
almost certainly implemented in twice iterative dominance. We now present the full proof 
of the theorem in the following section. 
 
5. Full Proof of the Theorem 
 
We model the three-stage procedure in Section 4 as a mechanism 
(,,) (,, ,,)
nr GG n r M g x
ε ==   as follows. Let  (0,1) ε ∈ , 
,1 ,2 ,3 ii i i M MMM =××,  ,1 [0,1] i M = , 
,2 i M   denote the set of continuous functions  ,2 :[0,1] [0,1]
n
i m → , 





− → , 
   
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 3 () ( 1 )
6
SBSBSB g gggggg g
ε
ε =+ + + + + + − , and 
    
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ()
6
SBSBSB
ii i i i i i x xxxxxx
ε
=+ + + + +
3 (1 ) i x ε +− . 
Here, 
    
, :( )
Dl g MA →∆  for  all (, ){ ,}{ 1 , 2 , 3 } Dl SB ∈ × , and 
3 :( ) g MA →∆ . 
    
, :
Dl
i x MR →  for  all (, ){ ,}{ 1 , 2 , 3 } Dl SB ∈ × , and 
3 : i x MR → . 
Each player  i simultaneously chooses a message  ,1 ,2 ,3 (,,) ii i i mm m m = , where  ,1 [0,1] i m ∈  
corresponds to the first bid, the value  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () [ 0 , 1 ] iN i mm β − ∈  of the function  ,2 i m    22
corresponds to the second bid, and the value  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () [ 0 , 1 ] iN N i mm β ∈  of the function  ,3 i m  
corresponds to the third bid. In the following two subsections, we specify 
,,
(, ) { , } { 1 , 2 , 3 } (, () )
Dl Dl
ii N D l S B gx ∈∈ ×  and 
33 (, ()) ii N gx ∈ , which define the random fixed price rule 
and the price-taking rule, respectively. The central planner uses the random fixed price rule 
with probability ε  and the price-taking rule with probability 1 ε − . Hence, the central 
planner chooses any alternative  aA ∈   with the following probability: 
,3
(, ) { , } { 1 , 2 , 3 }








=+ − ∑ . 
The monetary transfers conducted by the central planner are set such that they are equal to 
the expected values of the monetary transfers induced by the three-stage procedure.
6 
 
5.1. Random Fixed Price Rule 
 
For every  (,) ma M A ∈× , let 
,1 ,1
1
() ( ) () (, )
nr
SS
ii n r i
i




                                                 
6 Here, we assume quasi-linearity and risk neutrality. Without these assumptions, we need to 
modify the construction of mechanisms by using lotteries over combinations of an alternative and 
transfers. It might be important to verify the robustness of our results in terms of a non-expected 
utility, which is beyond the purpose of the present paper.   23
    
,1
,1 () ( 1 , 0 )
S
ii g mm = , 
,1
,1 () ( 0 , 1 )1
S
ii g mm =− , 
,1() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
S
i gm = , and 
,1() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
S
i gm = . 
With probability  ,1 1 i m − , seller  ' is   commodity is transferred to buyer  nr i + . Let 
,1
2 1








xm p d p
−
≡= ∫  and 
,1 ,1 () ()
SS
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects a price  p  from the interval [0,1], for which the 
commodity is transferred from seller  i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,1 i mp < . Note that 
,1()
S
i x m   corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer  nr i +  to  seller i. For 
every  (,) ma M A ∈× , let 
,1 ,1
1
() ( ) () (, )
nr
BB
ii n r i
i




    
,1
,1 () ( 1 , 0 )1
B
in r i gm m + =− , 
,1
,1 () ( 0 , 1 )
B
in r i gm m + = , 
,1() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
B
i gm = , and 
,1() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
B
i gm = . 













+ ≡= ∫  and 
,1 ,1 () ()
BB
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects  p  from  [0,1] , for which the commodity is 
transferred from seller i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,1 nr i mp + > . Note that 
,1()
B
i x m  
corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer  nr i +  to  seller i.   24
For every  (,) ma M A ∈× , let 
,2 ,2
1
() ( ) () (, )
nr
SS
ii n r i
i




    
,2
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () ( 1 , 0 ) ( )
S
ii N i gm m m β − = , 
,2
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () ( 0 , 1 )1 ( )
S
ii N i gm m m β − =− , 
    
,2() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
S
i gm = , and 
,2() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
S
i gm = . 
With probability  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 1( ) iN i mm β − − , seller  ' is  commodity is transferred to buyer  nr i + . 
Let 
,2 ( ( ) 1),1
2 1















≡= ∫ , and 
,2 ,2 () ()
SS
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects  p  from  [0,1] , for which the commodity is 
transferred from seller i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm p β − < . Note that 
,2()
S
i x m   corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer  nr i +  to  seller i. For 
every  (,) ma M A ∈× , let 
,2 ,2
1
() ( ) () (, )
nr
BB
ii n r i
i




    
,2
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () ( 1 , 0 )1 ( )
B
in r i N i gm m m β +− =− , 
,2
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () ( 0 , 1 ) ( )
B
in r i N i gm m m β +− = , 
    
,2() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
B
i gm = , and 
,2() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
B
i gm = . 
With probability  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () nr i N i mm β +− , seller  ' is  commodity is transferred to buyer  nr i + .   25
Let 
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () 2





nr i N i mm
nr N i B
i
mm




+− ≡= ∫ , and 
,2 ,2 () ()
BB
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects  p  from  [0,1] , for which the commodity is 
transferred from seller  i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () nr i N i mm p β +− > . Note that 
,2()
B
i x m   corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer  nr i +  to  seller i. 
For every  (,) ma M A ∈× , let 
,3 ,3
1
() ( ) () (, )
nr
SS
ii n r i
i




    
,3
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () ( 1 , 0 ) ( )
S
ii N N i gm m m β = , 
,3
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () ( 0 , 1 )1 ( )
S
ii N N i gm m m β =− , 
    
,3() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
S
i gm = , and 
,3() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
S
i gm = . 
With probability  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 1( ) iN N i mm β − , seller  ' is   commodity is transferred to buyer  nr i + . 
Let 
,3 \ ( ( )),1
2 1













≡= ∫ , and 
,3 ,3 () ()
SS
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects  p  from  [0,1] , for which the commodity is 
transferred from seller i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm p β < . Note that   26
,3()
S




() ( ) () (, )
nr
BB
ii n r i
i




    
,3
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () ( 1 , 0 )1 ( )
B
in r i N N i gm m mβ + =− , 
,3
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () ( 0 , 1 ) ( )
B
in r i N N i gm m mβ + = , 
    
,3() ( 0 , 0 ) 0
B
i gm = , and 
,3() ( 1 , 1 ) 0
B
i gm = . 
With probability  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () nr i N N i mm β + , seller  ' is  commodity is transferred to buyer  nr i + . 
Let 
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () 2





nr i N N i mm
nr N N i B
i
mm




+ ≡= ∫ , and 
,3 ,3 () ()
BB
nr i i x mx m + ≡− . 
The central planner randomly selects  p  from  [0,1] , for which the commodity is 
transferred from seller  i to buyer nr i +  if and only if  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () nr i N N i mm p β + > . Note that 
,3()
B
i x m   corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer  nr i +  to  seller i. 
 
5.2. Price-Taking Rule 
 




() ( ) () ( )
r
N gma gma ββ
β=
=∏ ,   27
where 
3
() :( ) N gM A ββ →∆  will be specified later. For every ( , ) {1,..., } mr M β ∈× , let 
( , ):{1,...,2 } ( ) mn N µ ββ →   denote the one-to-one mapping defined by 
( , )(1),2 ( 1),1 ( , )(2),2 ( 1),1 ( , )(2 ),2 ( 1),1 () () () mN mN m n N mm mm m m µβ β µβ β µβ β −− − ≥≥   , where for every 
{1,..., 2 1} ln ∈− , if  ( , )( ),2 ( 1),1 ( , )( 1),2 ( 1),1 () () ml N ml N mm m m µβ β µβ β −+ − = , then 
(,) ( ) (,) ( 1 ) ml ml µ βµ β <+ . For every  ( , ) {1,..., } mr M β ∈ × , let 
( , )( ),2 ( 1),1 () (,) ( ) mn N pp m m m µβ β β β − =≡  
denote the market-clearing price for group  β   that is calculated on the basis of the second 
bids  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ) (( ) ) iN i i N mm β β −∈ . Let  ( , ) {1,...,2 } np n β ∈   denote the integer such that 
     ( , )( ( , )),3 \ ( ),1 ( , )( ( , ) 1),3 \ ( ),1 () () mn p N N mn p N N mm p m m µβ β β µβ β β + >≥ , 
which represents the number of players in group  β   whose third bids are greater than  p . 
Let  ( , ) {1,...,2 } np n β ∈     denote the integer such that 
     ( , )( ( , )),3 \ ( ),1 ( , )( ( , ) 1),3 \ ( ),1 () () mn p N N mn p N N mm p m m µβ β β µβ β β + ≥> , 
which is the number of players in group  β  whose third bids are greater than or equal to 
p . Clearly,  (,) (,) npnp β β ≥   . For each ( , ) {1,..., } mr M β ∈ × , we specify 
3() g m β  as 
follows. Let  ( 1, ) p pm β =−. 
 
Case 1: Suppose  (,) npn β ≥ . In this case, for every  () () NN aA β β ∈ , 
3
() () ( ) N gma ββ =








if  ,3 \ ( ),1 [1 ] [ ( )] ii N N am m p β = ⇒>  for  all  () iN β ∈ ,   28
whereas 
3
() () ( ) 0 N gma ββ =  otherwise. 
 
Case 2: Suppose  (,) (,) npn np β β ≥>   . Then, for every  () () NN aA β β ∈ , 
    
3
() () ( ) N gma ββ =
((, ) ) ! { (, ) } !
{( , ) ( , ) } !









if  ,3 \ ( ),1 [1 ] [ ( )( , ) ] ii N N am m p m β β = ⇒≥  and 
,3 \ ( ),1 [( ) ][ 1 ] iN N i mm p a β >⇒=  for  all  () iN β ∈ , 
whereas 
3
() () ( ) 0 N gma ββ =  otherwise. 
 
Case 3: Suppose  (,) nn p β ≥   . Then, for every  () () NN aA β β ∈ , 
    
3
() () ( ) N gma ββ =
!{ ( , )}!










if  ,3 \ ( ),1 [( ) ][ 1 ] iN N i mm p a β ≥⇒=  for  all  () iN β ∈ , 
whereas 
3
() () ( ) 0 N gma ββ =  otherwise. 
 
The central planner sets the trading price for each group  β   such that it is equal to the 
market-clearing price  (1 ) p β −  for its preceding group  1 β − . Those players in each 
group  β  whose bids are greater than  (1 ) p β −  have a higher priority to consume the 
commodity than do the others. Players whose bids are equal to  ( 1, ) p m β −  have a  higher 
priority than those whose bids are less than  ( 1) p β − .   29
One interpretation is as follows. Every seller in each group  β   is compelled to sell the 
commodity to the central planner for  (1 ) p β − . The central planner then sells these  n 
units back to the players in the same group  β  whose  third bids are greater than  (1 ) p β − . 
If the third bids of more than  n  players are bids greater than  (1 ) p β − , the central planner 
randomly selects from among these players and sells the commodities to them. This 
corresponds to Case 1. If less than  n players in group  β  make their third bids greater 
than or equal to  (1 ) p β − , the central planner randomly selects from among the rest of the 
players and compels the selected players to buy the unsold commodities. This corresponds 
to Case 3. If less than  n players make their third bids greater than  (1 ) p β −  and more 
than  n players in group  β  make their third bids greater than or equal to  (1 ) p β − , the 
central planner sells the commodities to the players who make their third bids greater than 
(1 ) p β − , and then randomly selects from among the players who equal their third bids to 
(1 ) p β −   and compels them to buy the unsold commodities. This corresponds to Case 2. 
For every  ( ) {1,..., } iN n r β ∈ ∩ , let 
() ()
33








=− − ∑ . 
For every  (){ 1 , . . . , 2} iN n r n r β ∈+ ∩ , let 
() ()
33








=− − ∑ . 
Any buyer  () iN β ∈  who consumes the commodity must pay  (1 ) p β − . Any seller 
() iN β ∈  who does not consume the commodity can receive  (1 ) p β − . Hence, we have   30
completed the construction of the mechanism 
(,,) (,, ,,)
nr GG n r M g x







=   denote an infinite sequence in which 
() 1 (0, ) 6
l ε ∈ , 
() l ε  decreases  with 




→∞ = . For each  1,2,..., l =  let 
() () () () ( , , )
lll ln r GG
ε ≡ . In the following 






=   satisfies the properties of the theorem. 
 
5.3. Twice Iterative Dominance 
 
All the functions relevant to player  ' is utility  are 
, D l
i g  and 
, D l
i x  for  all 
(, ){ ,}{ 1 , 2 } Dl SB ∈× , 
3
() i gβ , and 
3
() i xβ . Suppose that player  i  is a seller, i.e.,  {1,..., } in r ∈ . 
Then, among these functions, only 
,1 S
i g  and 
,1 S
i x  depend on player  ' is  first bid  ,1 i m  
and only on this bid. According to the specifications of 
,1 S
i g  and 
,1 S
i x , player i will 












+ , i.e.,  ,1 () ii mv ω = . Suppose that player  i is  a 
buyer, i.e.,  { 1,...,2 } in r n r ∈+ . Then, among these functions, only 
,1 B
i g  and 
,1 B
i x  depend 
on player  ' is  first bid  ,1 i m  and only on this bid. According to the specifications of 
,1 B
i g  
and 
,1 B








mv ω − , i.e.,  ,1 () ii mv ω = . 
Hence, we have proved that for every  iN ∈ , if  i s  is undominated, then it must hold that 
,1() () ii i sv ω ω =  for all  ii ω ∈Ω . From Assumption 3, if all players play undominated 
strategies, then each player’s first bid truthfully reveals her private signal. Assuming that all   31
players play undominated strategies, their first bids truthfully reveal their private signals. 
Suppose that player  i is a seller. Then, among the functions 
, D l
i g  and 
, D l
i x  for all 
(, ){ ,}{ 1 , 2 } Dl SB ∈× , 
3
() i gβ , and 
3
() i xβ , only 
,2 S
i g  and 
,2 S
i x   depend on player  ' is  second 
bid  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm β −   and only on this bid. The specifications of 
,2 S
i g  and 
,2 S
i x , along with 
the truthful revelation via  (( ) 1 ) , 1 Ni m β − , imply that player  i will choose  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm β −  to 
maximize 
2
(( ) 1 ) , 1
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1)
1
() ( , )
2
Ni








+ , i.e., 
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( , ) iN i i N i mm v ββ ω ω −− = . Suppose that player i is a buyer. Then, among these 
functions, only 
,2 B
i g  and 
,2 B
i x  depend on player  ' is  second bid  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm β −  and 
only on this bid. The specifications of 
,2 B
i g  and 
,2 B
i x , along with the truthful revelation 
via  (( ) 1 ) , 1 Ni m β − , imply that player i  will  choose  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 () iN i mm β −  to  maximize 
2
(( ) 1 ) , 1
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( , )
2
Ni






−− − , i.e.,  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( , ) iN i i N i mm v ββ ω ω −− = . Hence, 
for every  iN ∈ , if  i s   is twice iteratively undominated, then 
     ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( ) (, ) iiN i i N i sm v ββ ω ωω −− =  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω  
if  ,1 () j j mv ω =  for  all  (( )1 ) jN i β ∈ − . 
Suppose that player  i is a seller. Then, among the functions 
, D l
i g  and 
, D l
i x  for all 
(, ){ ,}{ 1 , 2 } Dl SB ∈× , 
3
() i gβ , and 
3
() i xβ , only 
,3 S
i g , 
3 g , 
,3 S
i x , and 
3
i x  depend on player 
' is  third bid  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β . Moreover, 
,3 S
i g  and 
,3 S
i x  depend only on this bid. The 
specifications of 
,3 S
i g  and 
,3 S
i x , along with the truthful revelation via  \ ( ( )),1 NN i m β , imply   32
that the expected utility for player  i induced  by 
,3 S
i g  and 
,3 S
i x  is 
2
\ ( ( )),1
,3 \ ( ( )),1 \ ( ( ))
1
() ( , )
2
NN i







which is concave with respect to  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β   and is maximized by 
,3 \ ( ( )),1 \ ( ( )) () ( , ) i N Ni iN Ni mm v ββ ω ω = . 
Suppose that player  i  is a buyer. Then, among these functions, only 
,3 B
i g , 
3 g , 
,3 B
i x , 
and 
3
i x  depend  on  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β . Moreover, 
,3 B
i g  and 
,3 B
i x  depend  only  on 
,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β . According to the specifications of 
,3 B
i g  and 
,3 B
i x , along with the truthful 
revelation via the first bids  \ ( ( )),1 NN i m β   by all the other groups, it follows that the expected 
utility for player  i induced  by 
,3 B
i g  and 
,3 B
i x  is 
    
2
\ ( ( )),1
,3 \ ( ( )),1 \ ( ( )) () ( , )
2
NN i




ββ ωω − , 
which is concave with respect to  ,3 \ ( ( )),1 () iN N i mm β   and is maximized by 
,3 \ ( ( )),1 \ ( ( )) () ( , ) i N Ni iN Ni mm v ββ ω ω = . 
Fix  iN ∈  arbitrarily, and consider the expected utility for player  i induced by 
3 g  
and 
3
i x . Let  ( ( ) 1, ) p pi m β =− . From the specifications of 
3 g  and 
3
i x , for each  ω∈Ω, 
there exist  v  and v    such  that  
   
33 ()() () ii g mv x m v ω −=  for  all  ,3 \ ( ( ) 1),1 () iN N i mm p β − > , 
   
33 ()() () ii g mv x m v ω −=   for  all  ,3 \ ( ( ) 1),1 () iN N i mm p β − < , 
   
33 min[ , ] ( ) ( ) ( ) max[ , ] ii vv g mv x m vv ω ≤− ≤     for  ,3 \ ( ( ) 1),1 () iN N i mm p β − = ,   33
    vv >        if  () i vp ω > , 
and 
    vv <        if  () i vp ω < . 
From the above observations, it is clear that if all players play undominated strategies, then 
    
(( ) ) \ { } (( ) ) \ { }
\{ } ,3 \ ( ( )),1 \{ } min ( , ) ( ) max ( , )
Ni i Ni i
i i Ni i N N i i i Ni vm m v
β β
β ω ω ω ωω ω ≤ ≤  
       w h e n e v e r   ,1 () j j mv ω =  for  all  \ ( ( )) j NN i β ∈ . 
Hence, we have proved that if all players play any twice iteratively undominated strategy 
profile  s S ∈ , then, for every  iN ∈ , 
,1() () ii i sv ω ω =  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω , 
,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( ) (, ) iiN i i N i sm v ββ ω ωω −− =  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω  
if  ,1 () j j mv ω =  for  all  (( )1 ) jN i β ∈ − , 
and 
(( ) ) \ { } (( ) ) \ { }
\{ } ,3 \ ( ( )),1 \{ } min ( , ) ( ) max ( , )
Ni i Ni i
i i Ni i N N i i i Ni vm m v
β β
β ω ω ω ωω ω ≤ ≤  
if  ,1 () j j mv ω =  for  all  \ ( ( )) j NN i β ∈ . 
 
5.4. Competitive Allocations 
 
Since the size  2n  of each group is sufficiently large, it is almost certain from the law 
of large numbers and Assumptions 1 and 3 that  ,2 ( ( ) 1),1 ( ( ) 1) () ( , ) iN i i N i mm v ββ ω ω −− =    34
approximates  0 (,) ii v ω ω , and from Assumption 2 that  ( , ) p m β  approximates  0 (, ) p e ω . 
Since the number  r  of distinct groups is sufficiently large, it is almost certain that both 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } min ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω  and 
(( ) ) \ { }
\{ } max ( , )
Ni i
iiN i v
β ω ω ω  approximate  0 (,) ii v ω ω , and therefore, 






= , for 
sufficiently large l , the price-taking rule 
33 (,) g x  almost certainly determines the 
allocation, which implies that the probability of each player  i receiving one unit is close 
to 1 (close to zero) if 
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω >  (if 
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω < ). The monetary 
transfer to seller i  approximates 
*
0 (. ) p e ω  (zero)  if 
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω <  
(
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω > ). Moreover, the monetary transfer to buyer i  approximates 
*
0 (, ) p e ω −  (zero)  if 
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω >  (
*
00 (,) (, ) ii vp e ωω ω < ). Thus, we have 
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